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Navigating Sovereignty and Transnational Commercial Law: 
The Use of Comity by Australian Courts 
Thomas Schultz and Jason Mitchenson 
Abstract: Academically, the principle of comity is all but dead.  Not only is there a distinct 
lack of literature regarding the principle, but in circumstances where it is addressed it is 
considered to be of negligible importance for the resolution of modern private international 
law disputes.  However, a review of Australian case law demonstrates that there is a 
significant disjunct between the academic view of comity and its actual use in judicial 
practice.  In the last ten years, over 850 Australian court decisions have made reference to 
comity – many of which relate to the field of private international law.  In this article, the 
authors review 77 Australian cases where comity played a definitive role in the resolution of 
private international law issues.  These cases demonstrate that comity is a relevant, useful 
legal tool to guide the development and application of private international law rules – doing 
so in a manner that helpfully mediates between the political need to uphold the doctrine of 
sovereignty and the commercial and judicial need to permit law to act transnationally in order 
to accommodate international commerce.  This is the purpose for which comity was created 
almost 400 years ago and the examined case law demonstrates that it continues to be effective 
in reflecting these interests in the law. 
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1. Introduction 
How best to reconcile the basic political doctrines of the modern state system and the 
growing need to make the geography of the law match the geography of today’s commercial 
realities?  The rub lies in the fact that the modern state system is built on ideas of sovereignty 
and non-interference, while today’s commercial realities have become increasingly 
transnational: they spill over the borders of any given State but are not distinctly inter-
national (in the sense of ‘between States’).  Whilst political, legislative and normative 
recommendations have been offered in abundance to reconcile these positions, modern 
transnational commerce (and the resolution of transnational disputes) is, in many ways, still 
hindered by traditional sovereign boundaries. 
From a black-letter law perspective, an interesting yet so far quite under-researched part of 
the solution may be found in the principle of comity – this elusive concept that (mostly) 
everyone has heard of, but nobody can really define.   Australian law offers some particularly 1
interesting insights in this regard.  Comity thrives in Australia, though it is in half-covert 
action: a textbook account of Australian private international law tells us there is little to be 
seen, but our review of recent case law suggests a different reality.   In many cases, comity 2
plays a definitive role in the development and application of Australian private international 
law rules and provides guidance to courts as to the appropriate exercise of their judicial 
power.  
The fact that conventional literature has cold-shouldered the principle has led to insufficient 
knowledge, inadequate understanding and quite some confusion about what comity may or 
 This article uses the term comity, doctrine of comity or concept of comity interchangeably. The concept is also known in 1
some jurisdictions to varying degrees as comitas gentium, courtoisie internationale and Völkercourtoisie.  Prior studies of 
comity do exist but this has not dispelled the general confusion surrounding the principle.  For other studies, in other 
contexts, see Adrian Briggs, “The Principle of Comity in Private International Law” (2011) 354 Hague Lectures 65; 
Lawrence Collins, “Comity in Modern Private International Law” in J.J. Fawcett (ed.), Reform and Development of Private 
International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002); Francisco Javier Zamora Cabot, “Sobre la International Comity 
en el sistema de derecho internacional privado de los EE.UU” (2010) Revista Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales; 
Hessel E. Yntema, “The Comity Doctrine” (1966) 65 Michigan Law Review 9; Joel R. Paul, “The Transformation of 
International Comity” (2008) 71 Law and Contemporary Problems 19; Joel R. Paul, “Comity in International Law” (1991) 
32 Harvard International Law Journal 1; Alan Watson, Joseph Story and the Comity of Errors (University of Georgia Press, 
London, 1992); Donald E. Childress, “Comity as Conflict: Resituating International Comity as Conflict of Laws” (2010) 44 
U.C. Davis L. Rev. 11.
 References to ‘comity’ are extremely rare in Australian academic literature.  One exception is Professor Mary Keyes who 2
notes in Jurisdiction in International Litigation (The Federation Press, Sydney 2005) at 191-192 the relevance of comity in 
the context of granting anti-suit injunctions.
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may not mean.   This confusion is of course to the benefit of those who assert that comity 3
cannot play a significant role in the resolution of private international law issues.   But this 4
conclusion is not self-evidently correct.  There is confusion as to what comity entails – that is 
true.  However, the case law demonstrates that from a judicial perspective comity continues 
to be considered an important and relevant part of Australian private international law. 
This paper seeks to shed light on the importance of comity in the development and 
application of Australian private international law rules through a review of relevant case law.  
In doing so, it will attempt to sketch a functional definition of comity - one that takes into 
consideration comity’s historical purpose and the way in which it is used by the Australian 
judiciary.  Clarifying the meaning and role of comity through a functional definition may help 
unbridle comity’s legal potential: the better it is understood, the better it can be applied and 
the more useful it becomes. 
Importantly, this paper does not seek to analyse every instance of comity in Australian 
jurisprudence and should not be understood as a comprehensive guide to comity in Australia.  
Rather, its aim is to shed light on the judicial importance given to comity by the Australian 
judiciary and sketch a definition of comity in practice by reference to Australian case law.  
The primary purpose of this paper is to reposition comity as a useful and relevant principle of 
private international law worthy of further academic research.  Whilst this paper focuses 
solely on Australian case law, its findings should be of interest to scholars and practitioners in 
other legal orders - particularly those that share a common legal tradition.  5
2. The Idea of Comity 
In 1648, after four years of negotiations, the Treaties of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years 
War.   In doing so, they contributed to the consolidation of the doctrine of sovereignty, thus 6
 Paul, supra note 1 at 19-20 notes that scholars and courts outside of Australia have characterised comity as a choice of law 3
principle, a synonym for private international law, a rule of public international law, a moral obligation, expediency, 
courtesy, reciprocity, utility and diplomacy.  Due to the lack of consideration of comity in Australian private international 
law literature, case law demonstrates that Australian courts have largely relied on foreign decisions to gain an understanding 
of comity. 
 Paul, supra note 1 at 19-20 notes that there is a perception that comity is too vague, incoherent, illusory and ephemeral to 4
be of any use.
 Initial indications demonstrate that comity may play a similar role in the United Kingdom and to some extent in the United 5
States of America.  Likewise, it should not be forgotten that comity is a civil law invention and thus may continue to play a 
role in civil law jurisdictions – particular those in Europe. Paul, supra note 1; Watson, supra note 1; Briggs, supra note 1.
 Leo Gross, “The Peace of Westphalia” (1949) 42 American Journal of International Law 20.6
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helping to establish the legal-political foundations for the modern state.   In popular lore, the 7
Treaties actually established the modern state, but this is an exaggeration.   Rather, the idea of 8
sovereignty was merely implied as part of the negotiations of the Treaties.   It was thought 9
that a clear distribution of sovereign power would be a means to end the Thirty Years War 
and reduce the risk that something similar would happen again in the future.   Two of the 10
great components of sovereignty – the principles of self-determination and non-interference – 
helped establish an inter-national legal scene and clarify who had the right to do what on that 
scene.  11
The Thirty Years War had been fuelled by an unclear overlap of political, secular and spiritual 
power.   It was not only a bloody religious battle but also a great legal-political mess.   It 12 13
was thought at the time that an era of peace would require the creation of clear-cut States 
with separate regulatory scopes.  No more regulatory overlaps.  No more legal-political 
tangles.  The compartmentalisation of law yielded hope.  In this sense, the doctrine of 
sovereignty was based on the idea that ‘good fences make good neighbours’. 
This compartmentalisation of law, of course, never really matched the geography of social 
and economic life.   The boundaries laid down by the doctrine of sovereignty never 14
completely framed where people moved or how they interacted, let alone determined where 
actions exerted effects.  Hence, the question quickly became - what were States to do with 
disputes that fell within the regulatory scope of more than one State?  As international trade 
increased and multi-jurisdictional disputes became more frequent, it was clear there was a 
need to create a legal doctrine that would soften the sharp edges of the doctrine of 
 Nico Schrijver, “The Changing Nature of State Sovereignty” (1999) 70 British Year Book of International Law 65.7
 Martti Koskenniemi, “The Politics of International Law” (1990) 1 European Journal of International Law 4.8
 Stéphane Beaulac, “The Westphalian Legal Orthodoxy – Myth or Reality?” (2000) 2 Journal of the History of 9
International Law 148 at 152.
 Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law (5th edn, Cambridge, CUP, 2003) 21 at 25.10
 Georges Abi-Saab, “Cours général de droit international public” (1987) 207 Hague Lectures 15 at 48.11
 Beaulac, supra note 9 at 155.12
 Andreas Osiander, “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth” (2001) 55 International 13
Organization 251.
 James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (2nd edn, Oxford, OUP, 2007) at 10.14
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sovereignty.   Enter comity, and at a distance a host of principles and rules of private 15
international law inspired by it.  16
Comity was created as a legal tool to meet the political need to uphold the doctrine of 
sovereignty, and thereby protect the foundational pillar of the modern state system, whilst at 
the same time recognise the commercial and judicial need for law to apply transnationally in 
certain circumstances.  This is still the role it plays today. It serves to adapt, through the 17
separate but interconnected ideas of ‘recognition’ and ‘restraint’, the ‘Westphalian 
Equilibrium’,  based on the doctrine of sovereignty, to commercial and judicial realities.  It 18
operates as a balancing principle that helps judicial and legislative actors to accommodate the 
doctrine of sovereignty with concerns of doing justice to private litigants.  If sovereignty 
embodies the systemic value of order that underpins the idea that ‘good fences make good 
neighbours’, comity embodies, through the ideas of recognition and restraint, ‘the systemic 
value of reciprocal tolerance and goodwill’.   Comity does so by softening the hard edges of 19
the jurisdictional spheres of States laid down by the doctrine of sovereignty.  
Comity’s place in the ordering of legal systems may further be situated in the following 
manner – albeit with many simplifications relating to general problems concerning the 
ordering of legal systems.  The doctrine of sovereignty in international law empowers, and to 
a certain extent requires, States to act within their regulatory domains.   These domains, 20
however, are not without boundaries.  A sovereign, the traditional doctrine goes, recognises 
no higher authority.  On the international plane, this postulate translates into the principle of 
sovereign equality, and in a horizontal arrangement of state regulatory spheres.  In this 
scenario, the orderly coexistence of equal sovereign powers is ensured by recognition that the 
regulatory power of States is, at the same time, legitimate and subject to limits.  
 Childress, supra note 1 at 20-22; Gross, supra note 6 at 39; Yntema, supra note 1 at 26.15
 Thomas Schultz & David Holloway, “Les origines de la comity au carrefour du droit international privé et du droit 16
international public” (2011) 138 Journal du Droit International 863 and Thomas Schultz & David Holloway, “La comity 
dans l’histoire du droit international privé” (2012) 139 Journal du Droit International 571.
 Kurt Lipstein, Principles of the Conflict of Laws, National and International (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1981) at 14.17
 John Martin Gillroy, An Evolutionary Paradigm for International Law: Philosophical Method, David Hume, and the 18
Essence of Sovereignty (New York, Palgrave Macmillan 2013).
 Société Nat’l Industrielle Aérospatiale v United States Dist. Court (1987) 482 US 522 at 555 per Justice Blackmum.19
 Alex Mills, “Rethinking Jurisdiction in International Law” (2014) 84 British Yearbook of International Law 187 with 20
further references to Ruti Teitel, Humanity’s Law (Oxford, OUP 2011); Anne Peters, ‘Humanity as the A and Ω of 
Sovereignty’ (2009) 20 European Journal of International Law 513; Eyal Benvenisti, ‘Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: 
On the Accountability of States to Foreign Stakeholders’ (2013) 107 American Journal of International Law 295.
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How we perceive these limits has changed over time, echoing changes in the understanding 
of the concept of sovereignty.  After a phase in which state jurisdiction was considered 
plenary and restricted by positive prohibitions only,  it is now ordinarily recognised that the 21
regulatory power of States – and on a more general level, their sovereignty – can only extend 
as far as international law allows.   It is important to note that not every connecting factor  22
(such as territoriality, nationality or passive personality) enjoys the same support in 
international law and no jurisdictional rule is a magic bullet against every possible 
jurisdictional overlap – in fact, concurrent jurisdictional competence is tolerated by 
international law.   23
Leaving aside the cases in which regulatory overlaps are the deliberate choice of States by 
way of agreement, it is worth noting that rules of jurisdiction perform two related functions.  
First, they aim to minimise the risk and occurrence of conflict arising; and second, they 
supply the legal tools to work out a solution when conflict does occur.  Rules of private 
international law serve as an example - they too operate as ‘limits of international law 
jurisdiction’, expressions of concern relating to the international allocation of regulatory 
authority, of which they may be deemed a domestic implementation.   24
Comity, too, is one such instrument.  It allows us to mediate those conflicts that may occur 
when more than one State believes it has a legitimate basis to exercise regulatory power.  
When a court or legislature must determine whether to ‘recognise’ the legitimate exercise of 
regulatory power by another State, in situations of unavoidable conflict in which no rule 
provides an answer (or satisfactory answer) or where the applicable rule or rules require 
interpretation, comity, in principle, will come into play.  Likewise, when a court or legislature 
must determine whether it has a legitimate claim that other States should ‘recognise’ its own 
legitimate exercise of regulatory power, comity, in principle, will again come into play.  
 The judgment of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Lotus case is generally considered the high-water 21
mark of this conception:  S.S. Lotus (France v Turkey) (Merits), 1927 PCIJ Reports Series A No 10.
 James Crawford, Chance, Order, Change: The Course of International Law, General Course on Public International Law 22
(Leiden, Brill – Nijhoff, 2014) at 65.
 For a more in-depth discussion about the meaning and realties of regulatory spheres and overlaps see Alex Mills, The 23
Confluence of Public and Private International Law: Justice, Pluralism and Subsidiarity in the International Constitutional 
Ordering of Private Law (Cambridge, CUP, 2009) and Thomas Schultz, ‘Carving up the Internet: Jurisdiction, Legal Orders, 
and the Private/Public International Law Interface’ (2008) 19 European Journal of International Law 799.
 Mills, supra note 24 at 226 and 303.24
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Comity allows States to ‘go beyond’ the rules of jurisdiction (or soften their hard limits) by 
acknowledging that in certain circumstances there is a commercial and judicial need for one 
State to ‘recognise’ the application or exercise of another State’s laws or judicial power 
within its regulatory sphere.  Since territoriality is the most accepted basis for the exercise of 
sovereign power, these scenarios will most likely, but not exclusively, arise in cases of 
jurisdictional assertions going beyond a State’s borders.  A conflict of regulatory spheres 
under different heads of jurisdiction is also possible.   In such circumstances, comity will 25
provide for ‘recognition’ of those laws or judicial powers so long as they do not constitute an 
undue infringement of sovereignty by either shaping or guiding the application of private 
international law rules. 
By the same token, this idea of ‘recognition’ encompasses a legitimate claim that the 
application of laws or the exercise of judicial power by one State should be ‘recognised’ in 
another State if there is a sufficient commercial and judicial need to do so and it would not 
constitute an unacceptable challenge to that other State’s sovereignty.  What constitutes an 
‘unacceptable’ infringement of the doctrine of sovereignty in either circumstance is to be 
determined by weighing the gravity of the infringement against the commercial or judicial 
importance of the extra-jurisdictional use of regulatory powers.  This balancing act, which 
comity embodies, is highly context specific, but a review of Australian case law provides 
significant guidance as to how comity is used for this purpose. 
On the other hand, comity recognises that even if there is a commercial and judicial need to 
recognise the application of another State’s laws or judicial power, it may constitute an 
unacceptable infringement of the doctrine of sovereignty.  In such circumstances, comity will 
‘restrain’ those acts to the extent that they constitute such an infringement.  For States seeking 
to apply laws or exercise judicial power beyond the boundaries laid down by the doctrine of 
sovereignty and specific agreements, comity requires ‘self-restraint’ where it would constitute 
an undue infringement of another State’s sovereignty.  Likewise, comity enables States to 
‘restrain’ the effect of foreign laws and judicial acts that have been applied or exercised by a 
foreign State that come within their sovereign regulatory scope on the basis that it poses an 
unacceptable infringement of their sovereignty. 
 Mills, supra note 20.25
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The result is that comity will be relevant in two common scenarios.  The first is in 
circumstances where a court is, prima facie, permitted to apply domestic law or exercise its 
judicial power in an ostensibly unlimited manner, but it must determine how far and to what 
effect it would be appropriate.  In these types of cases the question is one of ‘self-restraint’ 
and whether or not the court can legitimately expect ‘recognition’ of its acts from a foreign 
State.  The second is in circumstances where a court must determine how far and to what 
extent it would be appropriate to recognise the effect of foreign laws or judicial power in its 
territory.  In these types of cases the question is to what extent the court should ‘restrain’ or 
‘recognise’ those foreign acts within its sovereign territory.  In both cases a comity analysis 
will be appropriate, if not required, because behind each judicial act of recognition or 
restraint lies an intricate matrix of sovereign, commercial and judicial interests that are 
required to be reflected in the law.  It bears noting that judicial power is not exercised for 
‘reasons of comity’.  Rather, comity is the means by which courts weigh and balance the 
commercial and judicial need to permit the transnational application of law and the political 
need to uphold traditional conceptions of sovereignty.  
Such an understanding of comity should provide useful guidance to courts regarding the 
appropriate exercise of their judicial power in individual private international law cases. The 
guidance will of course be soft, because it is for courts to determine whether the exercise of 
judicial power, in the circumstances of individual cases, will constitute an unacceptable 
infringement of the doctrine of sovereignty.  However, even soft guidance may be critically 
helpful in drawing the right lines with regard to the exercise of judicial power in these types 
of cases.  This is particularly so if that guidance is informed by a nuanced understanding of 
comity - one that takes into consideration its historical and systemic purpose and the interests 
it is attempting to reflect in the law.  Indeed, an examination of Australian case law reveals 
many examples where comity has played an invaluable role in guiding the development and 
application of private international law rules in a manner consistent with relevant sovereign, 
commercial and judicial interests. 
The balance of this article seeks to offer this examination by analysing three areas of 
Australian law where considerations of comity are particularly prevalent.  These include: 
statutory interpretation and the construction of international instruments and contracts; the 
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determination of jurisdiction and the selection of forum; and the recognition of foreign 
judgements.  26
3. Comity in the interpretation of statutes, international instruments and contracts 
3.1. Statutory interpretation 
The case law demonstrates that comity plays a key role in the interpretation of domestic 
legislation that has the potential to have an effect outside of Australia’s sovereign boundaries.  
A long line of cases have created an interpretive principle, based on comity,  according to 27
which courts should interpret domestic legislation, so far as the language permits, in a 
manner that does not constitute an unacceptable infringement of the doctrine of sovereignty.  
The principle can be said, analytically, to operate in two stages.  The first is the creation of a 
legal presumption against interpreting legislation ‘extra-territorially’; and the second is one of 
residual interpretation when the assumption is rebutted. 
The case law demonstrates that comity has formed the basis for the legal presumption that the 
legislature does not intend to deal with matters over which, according to the doctrine of 
sovereignty, jurisdiction rightfully belongs to another sovereign State.  In 1908 the High 
Court held in Jumbunna Coalmine No Liability  that: 28
Every statute is to be interpreted and applied as far as its language admits so as not to 
be inconsistent with the comity of nations or established rules of international law. 
 As stated above, this article does not seek to analyse all instances of comity in Australian jurisprudence.  Rather, it seeks 26
to analyse areas of law where comity is particularly prevalent.
 It bears noting that the High Court, which is the final court of appeal in Australia, has not laid down a definitive definition 27
of comity in Australia.  However, it has on a number of occasions adopted and approved of the well known definition of 
comity formulated by the United States Supreme Court in Hilton v Guyot, which reads as follows: “‘Comity’, in the legal 
sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it 
is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, 
having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who 
are under the protection of its laws”: Hilton v Guyot (1895) 159 US 113 at 163-164. On the impact of this case, see 
Lawrence Collins, “The United States Supreme Court and the Principles of Comity: Evidence in Transnational 
Litigation” (2006) 8 Yearbook of Private International Law 53. For Australian decisions approving of this definition of 
comity, see most notably CSR Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 345 at 395-396 per Dawson, Toohey, 
Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ and Lipohar v R (1999) 200 CLR 485 at 100 per Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne 
JJ.
 Jumbunna Coalmine No Liability v Victoria Coal Mines Association (1908) 6 CLR 309 at 363 per O’Connor J.28
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In 1938 the High Court reconfirmed its position in Barcelo  holding: 29
It is always to be understood and implied that the legislature of a country is not 
intending to deal with persons or matters over which according to the comity of 
nations, the jurisdiction properly belongs to some other sovereign or state. 
More recent decisions of the High Court,  State Courts  and Federal Courts  have 30 31 32
reaffirmed this position.  Recently, in B v T  her Honour Lyons J held that: 33
In the interpretation of general words in a Statute there is always a presumption that 
the legislature does not intend to exceed its jurisdiction.  Most Statutes, if their 
general words were taken literally in their widest sense, would apply to the whole 
world, but they are always read as being prima facie restricted in their operation 
within territorial limits… [T]his principle was based on the idea of comity of nations 
and that the legislature of one state is presumed not to deal with persons or matters the 
jurisdiction over which properly belongs to some other sovereign state. 
However, it should be noted that comity forms the basis of a legal presumption – not a rule.  
Thus, it can be displaced or rebutted by wording to the contrary.   Usually, it will only be 34
rebutted by explicit statutory language expressing the legislature’s intention to legislate extra-
territorially.  If it is the clear intention of parliament, courts cannot refuse to apply and 
enforce legislation, even if it might constitute an unacceptable challenge to the doctrine of 
sovereignty.   In Habib v Commonwealth of Australia  Perram J held that: 35 36
23 Barcelo v Electrolytic Zinc Co of Australasia Ltd (1932) 48 CLR 391 at 424 per Dixon J.
 Chu Kheng Lim and Ors v Minister for Immigration (1992) 176 CLR 1; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v 30
Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273; Kartinyeri v The Commonwealth (1998) 195 CLR 337; Re Maritime Union of Australia; Ex 
Parte CSL Pacific Shipping Inc (2003) 214 CLR 397.
 McGee v Gilchrist-Humphrey [2005] SASC 254; Singh v Singh [2009] WASCA 53; B v T [2008] 1 Qd R 33; R v Ahmad 31
Ahmad [2011] NTSC 71.
 Trade Practices Commission v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1989) 22 FCR 305; Worldplay Services Pty Ltd v 32
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2005) 143 FCR 345.
 B v T [2008] 1 Qd R 33 at 13-14 per Lyons J quoting with acceptance the position stated by DC Pearce and RS Geddes in 33
Statutory Interpretation in Australia, 5th ed, (Butterworths, Australia, 2001) at 133.
 Habib v Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 183 FCR 61; Worldplay Services Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and 34
Consumer Commission (2005) 143 FCR 345; Trade Practices Commission v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1989) 22 FCR 
305.
 Habib v Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 183 FCR 61; Kartinyeri v The Commonwealth (1998) 195 CLR 337; 35
Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 CLR 168.
 Habib v Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 183 FCR 61 at 37 per Perram J.36
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... comity between nations is a fine and proper thing, but it provides no basis 
whatsoever for this court to decline to exercise the jurisdiction conferred on it by 
parliament. 
However, even when the presumption is rebutted, comity still plays a role of residual 
interpretation.  Comity will still favour restriction of the judicial power to interpret legislation 
extra-territorially, but it is limited by the court’s obligation to interpret legislation according 
to the intent of the legislature.  What remains is the idea that legislation should be read, so far 
as possible, not to have an extra-territorial effect.   For some, the application of a presumption 
as to the legislature’s intent is artificial and unhelpful in the quest to determine the true 
application and scope of laws and legal principles.   However, as Dixon J held in Barcelo, 37
the presumption exists to ensure that courts do not offend the sovereignty of foreign States, 
and thus undermine the doctrine of sovereignty.   38
In this sense comity has guided the development and application of the presumption against 
extra-territoriality – strongly restricting the ability of courts to interpret legislation as having 
an effect outside Australian sovereign boundaries.  However, comity only exists in the form 
of a presumption – not a rule.  Arguably, if it were to exist in the form of a rule this would be 
too restrictive on domestic sovereignty and would restrict the courts from furthering 
legitimate commercial and judicial aims by extending the scope of legislation in certain 
cases.  The presumption merely favours an interpretation against extra-territoriality on the 
basis that in most cases such an interpretation will unacceptably challenge the doctrine of 
sovereignty.  By forming the basis for the presumption and guiding its application, comity is 
able to reflect relevant sovereign, commercial and judicial concerns in the law. 
3.2. International instruments and contracts 
Comity also plays a key role in the interpretation of international instruments and contracts.  
In this context comity places restrictions on the court’s interpretive process in an effort to 
achieve the commercial and judicial aim of transnationally consistent interpretation.  Comity 
 Briggs, supra note 1 at 96.  Briggs notes that as with many attempts to explain legal principles by reference to the 37
intention of the legislature it is simply not true.  More often than not the legislature will not have given any thought to the 
appropriate scope of legislation.
 Barcelo v Electrolytic Zinc Co of Australasia Ltd (1932) 48 CLR 391 at 424 per Dixon J.38
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is generally able to reconcile the political need to uphold the doctrine of sovereignty with this 
commercial and judicial aim because the act of interpreting international instruments and 
contracts is an essentially inward facing endeavour and there is little risk of courts offending 
the sovereignty of foreign States. 
In Great China Metal  the High Court held that it was ‘self-evidently’ desirable for public 39
international instruments, such as conventions and treaties, to be construed in a uniform 
manner and that Australian courts should strive to achieve this aim.  Similar comments have 
been repeatedly made by the High Court on a number of other occasions before and after 
Great China Metal.   Likewise the High Court has noted on a number of occasions that this 40
aim of transnationally consistent interpretation is consistent with the requirements of comity 
and should be viewed as the settled attitude of the High Court.   In particular, Kirby J noted 41
in Siemens Ltd  that in the construction of public international treaties and conventions, 42
comity requires that consideration be given to international case law to achieve the aim of 
uniform construction.  43
Similar comments have also been made in relation to the interpretation of private instruments 
that have wide international application.  However, the obligation comity places on courts to 
strive for a transnationally consistent interpretation does not appear to be as strong in the 
context of private international instruments as it is in the context of public international 
instruments.  One particularly interesting case is the Full Federal Court’s decision in Leonie’s 
Travel Pty Ltd  where Landers and Rares JJ thought it necessary to extend the principle of 44
transnational uniformity laid down by the High Court in relation to public international 
instruments to the construction of private international instruments.  Their Honours held that: 
 Great China Metal Industries Co Ltd v Malaysian International Shipping Berhad (1998) 196 CLR 161 at 38 per Gaudron, 39
Gummow and Hayne JJ.
 Shipping Corporation of India Ltd Gamlen Chemical Co A/Asia Pty Ltd (1980) 147 CLR 142; De Lv Director-General, 40
NSW Department of Community Services (1996) 187 CLR 640; Povey v Qantas Airways Limited & Anor (2005) 223 CLR 
189.
 Siemens Ltd v Schenker International (Aust) Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 418 at 154 per Kirby J making reference to 41
Shipping Corporation of India Ltd v Gamlen Chemical Co A/Asia Pty Ltd (1980) 147 CLR 142; DeL v Director-General, 
NSW Department of Community Services (1996) 187 CLR 640; Great China Metal Industries Co Ltd v Malaysian 
International Shipping Corporation Berhad  (1998) 196 CLR 161.
 Siemens Ltd v Schenker International (Aust) Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 418 at 154 per Kirby J.42
 Ibid at 153-154 per Kirby J.43
 Leonie’s Travel Pty Ltd v Qantas Airways Limited [2010] FCAFC 37.44
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... there is much to commend the approach that domestic courts should strive to adopt 
a uniform construction of documents that have wide international application, even if 
their genesis is not an international treaty.  45
In their Honours’ opinion, private standard form contracts used in international business 
should be given a uniform construction and Australian courts should strive to achieve this 
aim.   Interestingly, Landers and Rares JJ held that in the circumstances of the case a prior 46
decision of the English Court of Appeal regarding the same issue should have been followed 
by the primary Judge, unless he considered that the decision was irrelevant or plainly 
wrong.   In light of the commercial and judicial need to strive for a transnationally consistent 47
interpretation of private international instruments, their Honours held that comity demanded 
that the decisions of the English Court of Appeal be ‘recognised’ and be given considerable 
‘respect’ in Australia.  There was, in their opinion, an obvious commercial and judicial 
imperative for the courts of other nations to follow a decision of a court of the standing of the 
English Court of Appeal in cases concerning the international construction of commercial 
documents.   Whilst Landers and Rares JJ did not address the question, it can only be 48
assumed that comity would require that this same ‘recognition and respect’ be extended to the 
superior courts of other States. 
The decision in Leonie’s Travel demonstrates the Court’s recognition that a strict application 
of the doctrine of sovereignty – one that gives no recognition to the decisions of foreign 
courts – is simply unable to accommodate the commercial and judicial need to construe 
international contracts in a uniform manner.  In this case, the Court was able to use comity as 
a legal basis to permit foreign judicial acts to have effect in Australia where it would be 
commercially and judicially desirable to do so.  Importantly, their Honours did not hold that 
comity required that Australian courts follow the prior decisions of English courts – it was 
not binding in the sense a superior decision of an Australian court would be.  To do so would 
be offensive to Australian sovereignty and therefore constitute an unacceptable challenge to 
 Ibid at 48 per Landers and Rares JJ reaffirming the remarks made by Moore J in Leonie's Travel Pty Limited v 45
International Air Transport Association [2009] FCA 280 at 46.
 Leonie’s Travel Pty Ltd v Qantas Airways Limited [2010] FCAFC 37 at 58 per Landers and Rares JJ.46
 Ibid.47
 Ibid.48
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the doctrine of sovereignty.  Rather, their Honours merely held that comity required that 
considerable respect be given to the prior English judgment and that courts should bear in 
mind whether it is commercially and judicially desirable that a different interpretation be 
used.  In doing so, they were able to use comity to further the commercial and judicial aim of 
transnationally consistent interpretation without offending foreign or domestic sovereignty. 
3.3. Service outside the jurisdiction 
The case law demonstrates that considerations of comity have also played, and continue to 
play, a significant role in the development and application of the law surrounding service 
outside the jurisdiction.  In particular, the case law helps to highlight how comity is used by 
the courts to reflect changing sovereign, commercial and judicial interests in the law.  Below 
we review the role of comity in relevant case law concerning the service of originating 
applications and subpoenas outside the jurisdiction. 
Service outside the jurisdiction is governed by the civil procedure rules of the Supreme Court 
in each State and Territory and the civil procedure rules of the Federal Court and High 
Court.   Whilst similar in many regards, each set of rules is different.  Regardless of these 49
differences, in the context of discussing comity, one would expect the courts to interpret the 
law relating to service outside the jurisdiction in accordance with the general legal 
presumption against extra-territoriality.  As demonstrated in Part 3.1, comity plays a key role 
in restricting the interpretive function of the court in circumstances where domestic 
legislation or rules permit them to exercise judicial power outside of Australia’s sovereign 
boundaries.  However, a review of the case law demonstrates that comity works in a very 
different way in the context of service outside the jurisdiction.   
The case law demonstrates that comity plays differing roles depending on the effect of the 
service on the doctrine of sovereignty.  The more likely the service is to be perceived as a 
challenge to the doctrine of sovereignty the more likely it is that comity will place restrictions 
on the court’s ability to effect service.  For example, in circumstances where a party seeks 
leave of the court to issue a subpoena outside the jurisdiction, comity will place significant 
 The court has no inherent jurisdiction where such a statutory power does not exist: News Corporation Ltd v Lenfest 49
Communications Inc (1996) 40 NSWLR 250; Ward v Interag Pty Ltd [1985] 2 Qd R 552; Re Austral Oil Estates (in liq) 
(1986) 7 NSWLR 440; News Corporation Ltd v Lenfest Communications Inc (1996) 40 NSWLR 250.
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restrictions on the court’s ability to grant such leave on the basis that to do so is a direct 
exercise of domestic judicial power in a foreign State.  In most cases, such an exercise of 
power will be considered an unacceptable challenge to the doctrine of sovereignty.  
Conversely, in circumstances where a defendant applies to the court to set aside an 
originating application, comity will often not require that the court do so.  This is because 
originating applications are generally not considered to be as grave an infringement to the 
doctrine of sovereignty as subpoenas – they merely serve to notify the defendant of the 
proceedings in Australia and give them the opportunity to choose whether or not to appear 
and defend those proceedings.  Thus, whilst there may be commercial and judicial reasons to 
serve both subpoenas and originating applications, comity will place significant restrictions 
on the ability to serve the former, rather than the latter, because of its effect on foreign 
sovereignty. 
The case law allows us to make further observations as to comity’s role and ability to shape 
the law.  In particular, the case law demonstrates that comity has been used effectively to 
reflect changing perceptions of sovereignty, commerciality and justice in the law.  Changing 
perceptions of sovereignty and the need to develop transnational law, combined with 
developments in communications and transportation technology, have meant that comity need 
not act with the same restrictions as it did in the past.  For example, in the context of 
originating applications, comity plays a far less restrictive role than it once did, permitting 
service of originating applications outside the jurisdiction in furtherance of commercial and 
judicial goals.  Likewise, recent case law demonstrates that the longstanding restrictive nature 
of comity in the context of subpoenas may also be changing.  In particular, a heated debate 
has arisen between members of the New South Wales Judiciary as to whether comity should 
reflect these same changing perceptions of sovereignty, commerciality and justice in the law 
concerning subpoenas. 
3.3.1.Serving originating applications outside the jurisdiction 
The law regarding the service of originating applications differs depending on the applicable 
civil procedure rules.  Most civil procedure rules permit service outside the jurisdiction 
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without prior leave of the court.   In order for a plaintiff to serve an originating application 50
outside the jurisdiction without leave of the court, the plaintiff should satisfy the necessary 
criteria contained in the rules.   Such criteria exist to establish a connection with the matter 51
so that the court is not likely to be perceived as inappropriately assuming jurisdiction.   If the 52
plaintiff cannot fulfil the criteria for service without leave they may apply to the court 
seeking leave to serve outside the jurisdiction.  53
In general, an originating application will be served outside the jurisdiction without prior 
leave of the court.  Thus, comity will not be relevant at the service stage.  However, 
considerations of comity do become relevant in circumstances where the plaintiff seeks leave 
to proceed  against the defendant (where the defendant does not enter an appearance) or the 54
defendant applies to the court to set aside the originating application.   In the past, 55
considerations of comity placed significant restrictions on the court’s power to grant leave to 
proceed or refuse to set aside the originating application.   However, changing perceptions 56
of sovereignty and the commercial and judicial need to develop transnational law, combined 
with developments in communications and transportation technology, have meant that comity 
need not act with the same restrictions as it once did.  57
The High Court’s decision in Agar  is particularly illustrative of comity’s ability to reflect 58
these changing perceptions in the law.  Agar concerned an appeal from the New South Wales 
Court of Appeal which had refused to set aside service of an originating application outside 
 For example, see New South Wales Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 Rule 11.2; Also see the observations of Debelle J 50
at 89 in K and S Corporation Ltd and Anor v Number 1 Betting Shop Ltd and Ors [2005] SASC 228: ‘Most, if not all, of the 
Supreme Courts of the States and Territories have adopted a rule which, though similar to O 11 in England as to the 
circumstances in which the court will exercise jurisdiction over a foreign national out of the jurisdiction, differs in that leave 
to serve is not required.’
 For example, see New South Wales Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 Rule 11.2 and Schedule 6.  It should be noted 51
that because service is not subject to leave of the court, unauthorised service is possible. 
 For example, see New South Wales Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 Schedule 6.52
 For example, see New South Wales Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 Rule 11.5; Court Procedure Rules 2006 (ACT), 53
Reg 6505: ‘(1) The court may give leave for service outside Australia of (a) an originating process if service outside 
Australia is not allowed under Reg 6501 (Service outside Australia - service of originating process without leave).’
 For example, see New South Wales Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 Rule 11.4.54
 For example, see New South Wales Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 Rule 11.7.55
 Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552 at 570-571 per Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ: ‘Considerations of comity, 56
and consequent restraint, have informed many of the reported decisions about service out of the jurisdiction.’
 Ibid.57
 Ibid.58
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the jurisdiction.  Whilst the High Court noted that comity had traditionally played a 
restrictive role in the context of originating applications, changing perceptions of sovereignty 
and the commercial and judicial need to develop transnational law, combined with 
developments in communications and transportation technology required that comity reflect 
these changes in the law.  The High Court held: 
Considerations of comity, and consequent restraint, have informed many of the 
reported decisions about service out of the jurisdiction.  It is, however important to 
notice that rules of court, or local statutes, providing for service outside the 
jurisdiction are now commonplace – at least in jurisdictions whose legal systems have 
been formed or influenced by common law traditions.  Further, as the Court of Appeal 
rightly noted in its reasons in these matters, contemporary developments in 
communications and transport make the degree of “inconvenience and annoyance” to 
which a foreign defendant would be put, if brought into the courts of this jurisdiction, 
“of a qualitatively different order to that which existed in 1885.” 
The considerations of comity and restraint, to which reference has so often been made 
in cases concerning service out of the jurisdiction, will often be of greatest relevance 
in considering questions of forum non conveniens.  The starting point for the present 
enquiry, however, must be the terms of the Rules, not any general considerations of 
the kind just mentioned.  59
In the High Court’s opinion, in circumstances where the civil procedure rules provided 
plaintiffs with the power to serve originating applications outside the jurisdiction without 
leave of the court, comity was no longer required to play such a restrictive role.  Rather, 
modern conceptions of sovereignty, commerciality and justice, combined with contemporary 
developments in communications and transport technology, meant that States were less likely 
to perceive originating applications as a challenge to their sovereignty and recognise the 
commercial and judicial need for originating applications to be served within their 
jurisdiction. 
 Ibid.59
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However, comity does play a more restrictive role in circumstances where leave is required 
by the relevant civil procedure rules.  Take for example the cases of K and S Corporation  60
and Lightsource Technologies.   In the former case, which concerned leave to issue an inter 61
partes summons (which is similar to an originating application) outside the jurisdiction, 
Debelle J held that the fact the court is given discretion under the appropriate rules to grant or 
refuse leave implies that applications to serve outside the jurisdiction should not be granted 
as a matter of course.  Whether the discretion should be exercised is a question for comity.  In 
Debelle J’s opinion comity still favoured restriction of the power as a means of ensuring that 
courts would not ‘overreach’ and cause offence to other sovereign States.  However, his 
Honour held that the High Court’s decision in Agar meant that such (comity-induced) 
restrictions ought not to apply with the same force as they once did.  62
Similar comments were made in Lightsource Technologies,  which concerned an application 63
to grant leave to serve an originating application outside the jurisdiction.   Refshauge J held 64
that whilst comity had traditionally limited the judicial power to grant leave, Agar had called 
for an adjustment of its effect to more modern times, marked by changes in the international 
legal landscape and developments in communications technology.  In his Honour’s opinion, 
comity was to be used to reflect modern conceptions of sovereignty, commerciality and 
justice in the law which ultimately differed to those of the past.   In making these 65
observations his Honour ultimately granted leave. 
In the context of originating applications, it is important to note that the role of comity has 
not changed.  Comity is still used by the courts to reflect relevant sovereign, commercial and 
judicial interests in the law.  However, its effect has changed as a result of changes in these 
interests.  More specifically, the case law demonstrates that comity no longer acts with the 
 K and S Corporation Ltd and Anor v Number 1 Betting Shop Ltd and Ors [2005] SASC 228.  Note that whilst this case 60
concerned the application of the old South Australian civil procedure rules (Supreme Court Rules 1987) leave is still required 
for cases that do not satisfy the criteria for service without leave under the new rules (Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006). See 
rule 18.02 and 18.07 under the Supreme Court Rules 1987 and rule 40 and 41 under the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006.
 Lightsource Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v Pointsec Mobile Technologies Ab [2011] ACTSC 59.61
 K and S Corporation Ltd and Anor v Number 1 Betting Shop Ltd and Ors [2005] SASC 228 at 90-91 per Debelle J.62
 Lightsource Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v Pointsec Mobile Technologies Ab [2011] ACTSC 59.63
 The plaintiff had sought leave to serve the originating application outside Australia under Court Procedure Rules 2006 64
(ACT), Reg 6505(1)(a) which provides that the court may grant leave for service outside Australia for an originating 
application if service is not allowed under Reg 6501 (service outside of Australia where leave is not required).
 Lightsource Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v Pointsec Mobile Technologies Ab [2011] ACTSC 59 at 80-81per Refshauge 65
J.
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same level of restraint it once did.   Instead, it seeks to reflect in the law modern conceptions 66
of these same interests.  Changes in perceptions of these interests, combined with 
developments in communications and transport technology, means that States are less likely 
to consider the service of originating applications in their territory as an infringement of their 
sovereignty and more likely to recognise the commercial and judicial need for such service.  
In these circumstances, comity need not act with the same restraint it once did and may help 
facilitate the development of transnational law in furtherance of relevant commercial and 
judicial aims.  
The criteria that parties must satisfy to be permitted to serve without leave ensures that there 
will be little to no interference with the sovereignty of foreign State and that the service of 
originating applications will not pose an unacceptable challenge to the doctrine of 
sovereignty.  In circumstances where parties do not satisfy the criteria they will be required to 
seek leave of the court to serve outside the jurisdiction.  However, the decision in Agar means 
that considerations of comity need not act with the same restrictive force they once did.  Such 
a position enables courts to establish a balance between facilitating commercial and judicial 
interests whilst protecting the doctrine of sovereignty. 
3.3.2.Serving subpoenas outside the jurisdiction 
Subpoenas require leave of the court as they are, in effect, a compulsory order of the court 
requiring a party to appear or do some act.  A person who is issued with a subpoena, but fails 
to comply with it, will be liable for punishment for failing to comply with an order of the 
court.  Thus, the granting of leave to issue a subpoena constitutes a stronger and more direct 
exercise of judicial power because of its compulsive nature.  In 1990, Rogers CJ Comm D in 
Arhill  summarised the position with regard to the service of subpoenas outside the 67
jurisdiction: 
It is at the heart of the exercise of jurisdiction, by courts taking their system from 
England that, jurisdiction rests on presence or submission. Relevantly that is 
recognised in the concept that the courts of a State will exercise jurisdiction over 
 Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552 at 571 per Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ.66
 Arhill Pty Limited v General Terminal Company Pty Limited & Ors (1990) 23 NSWLR 545.67
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persons upon whom service may be effected within the boundaries of the State, or 
those who submit. Admittedly, that concept has received some extension or 
enlargement... Today, almost every sophisticated court system permits the service of 
process outside the territorial jurisdiction of the State, in certain specified 
circumstances. However, these circumstances are, in every case, most carefully 
defined in a manner which maintains a relationship between the action, in relation to 
which the process is sought to be served, and the State. Even so, the exercise of such 
jurisdiction has been described as "exorbitant" jurisdiction… 
Another way of stating the point is, "that a foreigner, resident abroad, will not lightly 
be subjected to a local jurisdiction".  The basis of that approach lies essentially in the 
respect which a State has for the sovereignty of another State. In other words, without 
the consent of the other State, the sovereign does not seek to exercise its rights and 
powers, in relation to legal proceedings, within the territory of another ... 
[There is] clear [statutory] authority for the Court to give leave to serve a subpoena 
outside Australia. The fact that an order made pursuant to it could, in some instances, 
involve an infringement of the sovereignty of another country does not mean that it is 
a reason for holding the rule to be invalid. Nonetheless, the rule should be construed 
consistently with "the established criteria of international law with regard to 
comity".  68
For Rogers CJ Comm D, this meant that it would be contrary to comity to grant leave to issue 
a subpoena outside the jurisdiction in the case at hand.  This was so even though the relevant 
civil procedure rule contained the necessary power to grant it.  In essence, the decision in 
Arhill meant that the power to grant leave should only be exercised in exceptional 
circumstances.   The rationale for such a position is simple – where one State seeks to 69
 Ibid at 550-553 per Rogers CJ Comm D.68
 Ibid at 553 per Rogers CJ Comm D. There is a multitude of cases to the same effect as Arhill, each holding that the 69
relevant rule did not confer the judicial power to issue a subpoena when interpreted in accordance with comity, or that it 
would not have been appropriate to grant leave to issue a subpoena because to do so would infringe the sovereignty of the 
foreign State: see for example News Corporation Ltd v Lenfest Communications Inc (1996) 40 NSWLR 250; Gao v Zhu 
[2002] VSC 64; Stemcor (A/sia) Pty Ltd v Oceanwave Line SA [2004] FCA 391; Ives v Lim [2010] WASC 136; Levy 
Schneider v Caesarstone Australia Pty Ltd [2012] VSC 126; Federal Treasury Enterprise (FKP) Sojuzplodoimport v Spirits 
International NV (2007) 157 FCR 558.
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exercise its domestic judicial power in the territory of another, this is likely to be considered 
by the latter as a breach of its sovereignty.  
When Arhill was decided in 1990, comity was used by the courts to reinforce the political 
need to uphold the doctrine of sovereignty.  Whilst comity did not constitute a complete bar 
to the exercise of the judicial power, it did culminate in the creation of precedent that strongly 
favoured restriction of the judicial power even where there were significant commercial and 
judicial reasons for its exercise.   Later decisions after 2000 demonstrate a similar position.   70 71
For example, in the cases of Stemcor and Federal Treasury Enterprise (FKP) 72
Sojuzplodoimport  both Courts considered that the exercise of the judicial power to grant 73
leave to issue a subpoena outside the jurisdiction would, in nearly all cases, constitute an 
unacceptable challenge to the doctrine of sovereignty.  The Courts acknowledged the 
commercial and judicial benefit of exercising their judicial power transnationally in both 
cases, but ultimately held that considerations of sovereignty would be offended if the power 
were to be exercised.  74
However, recent case law demonstrates that perhaps the effect of comity in shaping the law 
surrounding subpoenas is changing.  In 2012 Hallen AsJ in the New South Wales Supreme 
Court case of Caswell v Sony/Atv Music Publishing (Australia) Pty Ltd,  held that despite the 75
fact Agar concerned the setting aside of an originating application, the decision of the High 
Court represented a general change in the effect of comity in all matters regarding service 
 See the decision of Rogers CJ Comm D in Arhill Pty Limited v General Terminal Company Pty Limited & Ors (1990) 23 70
NSWLR 545 where his Honour conducted a comprehensive review of the case law up to that point.
 Gao v Zhu [2002] VSC 64; Stemcor (A/sia) Pty Ltd v Oceanwave Line SA [2004] FCA 391; Ives v Lim [2010] WASC 136; 71
Levy Schneider v Caesarstone Australia Pty Ltd [2012] VSC 126; Federal Treasury Enterprise (FKP) Sojuzplodoimport v 
Spirits International NV (2007) 157 FCR 558.
 Stemcor (A/sia) Pty Ltd v Oceanwave Line SA [2004] FCA 391.72
 Federal Treasury Enterprise (FKP) Sojuzplodoimport v Spirits International NV (2007) 157 FCR 558.73
 Stemcor (A/sia) Pty Ltd v Oceanwave Line SA [2004] FCA 391 at 11-12 per Allsop J: ‘I am not prepared to grant leave to 74
issue the subpoena even assuming that the court has power… I would adopt the approach of Rogers CJ Comm D in Arhill 
and view the service of an order upon a German company demanding that it do something in Australia on pain of 
punishment in proceedings to which it has not submitted as such an invasion of German sovereignty as not to be 
contemplated except in the most exceptional circumstances.’  In Federal Treasury Enterprise (FKP) Sojuzplodoimport v 
Spirits International NV (2007) 157 FCR 558 at 15-17 per Black CJ, Allsop and Middleton JJ, the Federal Court set aside a 
grant of leave to issue a subpoena on the basis that the primary Judge failed to act with the requisite caution comity 
demanded when there is an intrusion upon the sovereignty of a foreign State.  Their Honours held that the order clearly 
intruded upon the sovereignty of the foreign State, even though it was indirect and possibly only as a matter of perception. 
They also held that the approach of Rogers CJ Comm D in Arhill and Allsop J in Steamcor should have been adopted by the 
primary Judge.
 Caswell v Sony/Atv Music Publishing (Australia) Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 986.75
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outside the jurisdiction.  This was so not only in the context of originating applications but 
also with regard to subpoenas. 
In this day and age, in a highly integrated world economy, I am of the view that the 
principle of comity [insofar as it favours the restriction of judicial power] may have 
less weight than it did in the past.  Developments in communication and transport are 
practical considerations that should also be considered.  Issues of extraterritoriality 
must now be viewed in the light of the substantial changes that have taken place, in 
recent times, in the way businesses communicate with each other.  As is obvious from 
the connection between the Defendant and the Applicant, the business of each 
operates in a global economy. 
This view is supported by what was noted by Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and 
Hayne JJ in Agar v Hyde... albeit dealing with service of originating process outside 
the jurisdiction... 
I accept, however, that whilst the principle of comity should be adjusted in the light of 
a changing world order, this is not to say that those principles should be ignored or 
diminished. They are clearly relevant at the discretionary phase. I have borne these 
principles in mind.  76
Ultimately, his Honour refused to set aside a grant of leave to issue a subpoena outside the 
jurisdiction.  His Honour held that the applicable legal provision established the Court’s 
power to grant leave to issue subpoenas outside the jurisdiction and comity did not preclude 
the exercise of that power.  In his Honour’s view, if the effect of comity is adjusted in light of 
the ‘changing world order’, as it should be, then the circumstances of the case meant that 
comity should not act to compel the Court to set aside the subpoena.   His Honour’s held 77
that comity is still an important and relevant principle but it was required to reflect changed 
conceptions of sovereignty, commerciality and justice, and developments in communications 
and transport technology, in the law.  
 Ibid at 117-119 per Hallen AsJ.76
 Ibid at 119 and 126 per Hallen AsJ.77
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However, the decision of Hallen AsJ in Caswell has not been met with unanimous 
enthusiasm.  Only one year after the decision in Caswell, White J of the New South Wales 
Supreme Court came to the opposite conclusion in Gloucester.   For White J, whilst the 78
applicable civil procedure rules established the Court’s power to grant leave to issue 
subpoenas outside the jurisdiction, considerations of comity required the Court restrain itself 
from exercising that power in most cases.   It would indeed in most cases, he held, amount 79
to an inappropriate exercise of the judicial power of an Australian court in a foreign State.  80
White J noted that the documents sought by the subpoena in the case at hand were likely 
relevant to the determination of the issues raised and there was a judicial interest in granting 
leave to serve the subpoena.   However, his Honour was particularly critical of the position 81
taken by Hallen AsJ in Caswell that changes in the legal landscape and developments in 
communications technology meant that foreign States would be more relaxed than they 
would formerly have been to the exercise of foreign judicial power in their territory.   In his 82
view, despite the judicial interest in granting the subpoena, the service of a subpoena in a 
foreign State would constitute an unacceptable challenge to the doctrine of sovereignty.   83
Consistent with this approach, White J held that there is only one category of case where 
leave to issue subpoenas outside the jurisdiction may be granted as a matter of course – that 
is, cases where there is evidence that the foreign State will not object to the subpoenas being 
issued in its territory.  84
It is important to note that the disagreement between Hallen AsJ and White J is not in regard 
to the content, purpose or role of comity.  Rather, the disagreement is to comity’s ultimate 
effect – the former considered the issuance of the subpoena not to infringe the doctrine of 
sovereignty whilst the latter did.  In White J’s opinion, the principle in Agar could not be 
 Gloucester (Sub-Holdings 1) Pty Ltd v Chief Cmr of State Revenue [2013] NSWSC 1419.78
 Ibid at 9-14 per White J.79
 Ibid at 14 per White J.80
 Ibid at 9 per White J.81
 Ibid at 39 per White J.82
 Ibid at 9-11 per White J.83
 Ibid at 30 per White J.  For example, in Sweeney v Howard [2007] NSWSC 262 and B v T [2008] 1 Qd R 33 the New 84
South Wales Supreme Court and Queensland Supreme Court respectively accepted evidence made public by the government 
of the United Kingdom that it did not consider service in the United Kingdom of subpoenas issued by foreign courts to be an 
interference with its sovereignty.
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extended to the context of issuing subpoenas, because subpoenas pose a greater challenge to 
the sovereignty of foreign States than originating applications.  The difference is that service 
of an originating application merely notifies the defendant of the proceedings in Australia and 
gives them the opportunity to choose whether or not to appear and defend those proceedings.  
Conversely, granting leave to issue a subpoena constitutes a stronger, more direct exercise of 
judicial power because of its compulsive nature.  A person who is issued with a subpoena, but 
fails to comply with it, will be liable for punishment for failing to comply with an order of the 
court. An originating application has no coercive power, but a subpoena compels the recipient 
to do something with the penalty for non-compliance being contempt of court.  85
Thus, the debate between the two Justices is not about whether or not comity is relevant or 
important – the case law clearly demonstrates this to be the case.  Rather, the debate is about 
where the line should be drawn - that is, when should comity permit the exercise of judicial 
power and when should it restrain it.  To Hallen AsJ, a modern informed version of comity 
should favour a more transnational approach.  Comity should not restrict courts from 
exercising their judicial power to grant leave to serve both originating applications and 
subpoenas where it is commercially and judicially desirable to do so because changes in 
world relations, technology and the legal landscape mean that foreign States are less likely to 
perceive such actions as an infringement of their sovereignty.  Conversely, to White J, who 
favoured a more conservative view of international relations, comity should continue to 
favour restriction of such judicial power because it is likely to still be considered by foreign 
States to be an unacceptable challenge to their sovereignty.  To White J, whilst the service of 
an originating application in a foreign State fell within what was acceptable, the issuance of 
subpoenas in foreign States will generally fall outside of what is considered acceptable. 
The debate between the two Justices demonstrates that comity is particularly relevant in this 
area of law.  In each case, leave was heavily dependent on the Court’s comity-based analysis.  
Furthermore, whilst some may consider Hallen AsJ’s decision ‘too liberal’ or White J’s 
decision ‘too conservative’, both cases demonstrate the effectiveness of comity as a legal tool 
to shape law in a manner consistent with sovereign, commercial and judicial interests.  
 Gloucester (Sub-Holdings 1) Pty Ltd v Chief Cmr of State Revenue [2013] NSWSC 1419 at 31-32 per White J.  A similar 85
distinction was made by the United States Court of Appeal for the District of Columbia in Federal Trade Commission v 
Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-à-Mousson 636 F 2d 1300 (DC Cir 1980) at 1311.
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Evidently, a nuanced understanding of comity – including its historical purpose and the 
interests it seeks to reflect in the law – will provide courts with the guidance they need to 
exercise their judicial power appropriately in individual cases. 
3.4. Service outside the jurisdiction in accordance with international conventions 
When service is conducted in accordance with a valid international convention there will be 
no risk of infringing the sovereignty of foreign States.  Consequently, when a foreign State 
does not perceive service within its jurisdiction as a breach of its sovereignty, comity will 
have no role to play.  Two recent examples of cases concerning service in accordance with 
international conventions can be seen in the Federal Court decisions of Clifton (Liquidator), 
Re Solar Shop Australia Pty Ltd (In L)  and Donnelly, Re Advance Finance Proprietary Ltd 86
(in liq).  87
In Clifton, White J (who also delivered the judgement in Gloucester) held that leave to serve 
an originating application in China would not raise any issues of comity if it were served in 
accordance with the Hague Convention to which Australia and China were both party to.  
Likewise, in Donnelly, which dealt with an examination summons, Farrell J held that service 
carried out in accordance with accepted procedures for international proceedings 
demonstrated that a foreign State would not perceive service within its territory as a breach of 
its sovereignty. Accordingly, service in this manner would not challenge the doctrine of 
sovereignty. 
3.5. Domestic law that requires the contravention of foreign law 
Implicitly ordering the contravention of foreign law can also amount to a challenge of a 
foreign State’s sovereignty – a challenge of the type that comity takes into consideration, and 
weighs against often competing domestic sovereign interests and commercial and judicial 
necessity.  In Suzlon Energy Ltd  three Swiss banks applied to set aside notices to produce 88
documents or an order that each bank be excused from producing documents on the basis that 
compliance with the notices would result in each bank being required to contravene the Swiss 
 Clifton (Liquidator), Re Solar Shop Australia Pty Ltd (In L) [2014] FCA 891.86
 Donnelly, Re Advance Finance Proprietary Ltd (in liq) [2013] FCA 514.87
 Suzlon Energy Ltd v Bangad (2011) 198 FCR 1.88
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Federal Banking Act and / or the Swiss Criminal Code.  Rares J held that the defendants were 
put in the impossible position where compliance with one set of laws would result in 
contravention of the other.   He held that the defendants should not be required to answer the 89
notices to produce as comity requires that the courts of Australia do no compel persons to 
contravene the laws of foreign States.  90
In this sense comity provides courts with a legal basis by which they retain power to refuse 
specific relief if, by granting such relief, a person is compelled to contravene the laws of a 
foreign jurisdiction.   This power exists, to a large extent, to ensure courts do not offend the 91
sovereignty of foreign States.   However, comity does not act as an absolute bar to the 92
making of orders that may compel litigants to contravene foreign law.   What it requires is 93
that the court assess whether there are domestic sovereign, commercial and judicial concerns 
at stake that are so great that the court should compel the litigant in the circumstances of the 
particular case.  Whether the interests of enforcing a particular law are so commercially and 
judicially necessary (and important to the domestic sovereignty of Australia) as to warrant its 
enforcement depends on a number of factors including the significance of the proceedings, 
public interest, criminal penalties and the availability of alternate means by which a party 
may comply with the order without the risk of contravening foreign law.  94
The general position is that comity has formed the basis for precedent which strongly favours 
restriction of the judicial power to grant orders or enforce laws that have the potential to 
infringe the laws of foreign States.  This is the case even in circumstances where the 
 Ibid at 41 per Rares J. 89
 Ibid at 55 per Rares J.90
 Australian Securities Commission v Bank Leumi Le-Israel (Switzerland) (1996) 69 FCR 531 at 545B-C per Lehane J 91
(Lockhart and Foster JJ agreeing); Suzlon Energy Ltd v Bangad (2011) 198 FCR 1 at 43 per Rares J; Bank of Valletta PLC v 
National Crime Authority [1999] 90 FCR 565 at 567 per Wilcox, Whitlam and Lehane JJ.
 Suzlon Energy Ltd v Bangad (2011) 198 FCR 1 per Rares J applying the definition of comity adopted by the High Court 92
in CSR Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 345 at 395-396 per Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, 
Gummow and Kirby JJ.
 Michael Wilson and Partners Ltd v Nicholls (2008) 74 NSWLR 218; Nexans SA RCS Paris 393 525 852 v Australian 93
Competition and Consumer Commission [2014] FCA 255.
 Bank of Valletta PLC v National Crime Authority [1999] 90 FCR 565; Nexans SA RCS Paris 393 525 852 v Australian 94
Competition and Consumer Commission [2014] FCA 255; Hua Wang Bank Berhad v Commissioner of Taxation (2013) 296 
ALR 479. 
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commercial and judicial reasons for granting an order or enforcing a particular law are quite 
significant.  95
4. The determination of jurisdiction and the selection of forum 
4.1. Stay of proceedings on grounds of forum non conveniens and the granting of 
anti-suit injunctions 
Comity plays one of its most definitive and well-known roles in cases concerning stays on 
grounds of forum non conveniens and the granting of anti-suit injunctions.  In particular, the 
role of comity has gained most attention in the context of granting anti-suit injunctions.  This 
is because many States, particularly those from civil law traditions, consider the use of anti-
suit injunctions to be a breach of their sovereignty regardless of the commercial and judicial 
reasons for which they were granted.  96
From a commercial and judicial point of view, disputes should generally be litigated in the 
court with which the matter has the strongest connection.  The idea is that justice is more 
likely to be served, and in a more economical fashion, if the court which entertains the matter 
is the court which is the closest to the matter.  Anti-suit injunctions and stays on grounds of 
forum non conveniens are aimed at furthering these commercial and judicial aims.  However, 
their application is necessarily tempered by concerns for sovereignty – both foreign and 
domestic.  Thus, courts have used comity to shape and develop the law surrounding anti-suit 
injunctions and forum non conveniens in order to reflect these nuanced sovereign, 
commercial and judicial interests in the law. 
4.1.1.The role of comity in granting stay orders on grounds of forum non  conveniens 
In this area of law the principle of comity has shaped the development and application of the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens.  In particular, the adoption of the ‘clearly inappropriate 
 Hua Wang Bank Berhad v Commissioner of Taxation (2013) 296 ALR 479; Suzlon Energy Ltd v Bangad (2011) 198 FCR 95
1; Nexans SA RCS Paris 393 525 852 v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2014] FCA 255.
 CSR Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 345 at 389-390 per Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, 96
Gummow and Kirby JJ.  See also the decision of the European Court of Justice in Turner v Grovit [2004] ECR 1–3565.
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forum’ test now used by Australian courts was based on the perception that it is more in 
conformance with the dictates of comity than the ‘more appropriate forum’ test found in 
English jurisprudence.  The development and application of the doctrine permits Australian 
courts to reflect in the law relevant sovereign, commercial and judicial needs from an 
Australian perspective. 
In England, the House of Lords in Spiliada  laid down the ‘more appropriate forum’ test for 97
granting stays on grounds of forum non conveniens.  Lord Goff (with whom the other Law 
Lords agreed) held that the burden resting on the party applying for the stay ‘... is not just to 
show that England is not the natural or appropriate forum for the trial, but to establish that 
there is another available forum which is clearly or distinctly more appropriate than the 
English forum.’   Thus, in circumstances where there is another forum which is the natural 98
or more appropriate forum, English courts will ordinarily grant a stay unless there are 
extenuating circumstances that make it unjust to do so. 
In Australia, the High Court rejected the ‘more appropriate forum’ test as it exists in England, 
instead favouring the inward facing ‘clearly inappropriate forum’ test.   In Australia, the 99
touchstone is inappropriateness, not comparative appropriateness.  Thus, the focus of the test 
is on the inappropriateness of the Australian court to resolve the dispute, not the comparative 
appropriateness of other forums.  An Australian court does not become an inappropriate 
forum simply because another forum is deemed more appropriate.   The test thereby 100
becomes significantly more onerous for the party seeking the stay. 
 Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460. This paper does not contemplate the legal status of forum non 97
conveniens in England as a result of the United Kingdom’s participation in the European Union.  Rather, the discussion is 
purely used to demonstrate how considerations of comity shaped the adoption of a different test in Australia.
 Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460 at 477-478 per Lord Goff.98
 In CSR Ltd, the High Court held that the test which governs stay applications is that which was stated earlier by the High 99
Court in Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538: CSR Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd (1997) 189 
CLR 345 at 390-391 per Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ.  In Voth, the High Court unanimously 
declined to adopt the ‘more appropriate forum’ test adopted by the English House of Lords in Spiliada and instead adopted 
the test laid down by Deane J in Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co Inc v Fay (1988) 165 CLR 197, namely that a stay 
on grounds of forum non conveniens may only be granted if the Australian court is a ‘clearly inappropriate forum’.  It bears 
noting that in Voth, Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ provided a joint judgement favouring the ‘clearly 
inappropriate forum’ test over the adoption of the ‘more appropriate forum’ test established by the House of Lords in 
Spiliada.  Brennan J, despite preferring a different formulation of the test, expressed his support for the position of the 
majority holding that it was more important that the test be authoritatively settled than adhering to his own personal 
preference: Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538 at 572 per Brennan J.
 CSR Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 345 at 400-401 per Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, 100
Gummow and Kirby JJ; Regie Nationale des Usines Renault SA v ZHANG (2002) 210 CLR 503.
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The High Court’s decision to adopt the ‘clearly inappropriate forum’ test over the English 
‘more appropriate forum’ test was largely based on the High Court’s opinion that the ‘clearly 
inappropriate forum’ test was more in conformance with the requirements of comity.   101
When determining whether a stay should be granted, the ‘more appropriate forum’ test used 
in England requires that courts consider whether or not the plaintiff will obtain justice in the 
foreign jurisdiction.   The High Court held that a test that requires a court to pass judgement 102
on the quality or willingness of a foreign court to deliver justice is particularly offensive to 
the sovereignty of foreign States and therefore posed an unacceptable challenge to the 
doctrine of sovereignty.  103
Conversely, the High Court was of the opinion that the ‘clearly inappropriate forum’ test was 
more respectful of foreign sovereignty as it merely required that the Australian court 
determine its own appropriateness to be the forum to entertain a particular matter.   The High 
Court held that the fact the test was inward facing – in that it evaluated the Australian court’s 
appropriateness rather than the foreign court’s ability or willingness to deliver justice – was 
more in conformance with the commands of comity.  104
Interestingly however, the High Court seemed to overlook the fact that in certain cases the 
‘clearly inappropriate forum’ test may also contradict the dictates of comity.  Whilst the High 
Court adopted the ‘clearly inappropriate forum’ test to avoid having to pass judgement on the 
competency or willingness of foreign courts, the result of the test is that in some cases 
Australian courts will not grant a stay despite a foreign court being the natural or more 
appropriate forum.  In circumstances where it is clear that a foreign court is clearly more 
suitable than the Australian court, but it cannot be said that the Australian court itself is 
‘clearly inappropriate’, Australian courts will refuse to grant a stay.  Such a result is contrary 
to considerations of comity for it offends the sovereign interests of foreign States who have a 
legitimate, and potentially stronger, sovereign interest in entertaining the dispute and fails to 
 Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538 at 559 per Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ.101
 Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460 at 478 per Lord Goff; Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd 102
(1990) 171 CLR 538 at 559 per Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ.
 Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538 at 559 per Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ citing 103
the High Court’s earlier decision in Attorney-General (UK) v Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty Ltd (1988) 165 CLR 30.
 Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538 at 559-560 per Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ; 104
Henry v Henry (1996) 185 CLR 571.
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further the commercial and judicial aim of allowing the most appropriate forum to entertain 
the matter.  105
In many cases however, comity is able to reflect relevant sovereign, commercial and judicial 
concerns in the law.  One particularly instructive example of its ability to do so is the 2013 
case of Telesto  where Ward J granted a stay on grounds of forum non conveniens because 106
parallel proceedings were already on foot in Singapore and because the High Court of 
Singapore had granted an anti-suit injunction against the plaintiff from continuing 
proceedings in the New South Wales Supreme Court.  In that case Ward J held that comity 
required that the New South Wales Supreme Court give ‘due recognition’ to the judicial acts 
of Singapore when determining whether New South Wales was a ‘clearly inappropriate 
forum’ for the resolution of the dispute.  Comity did not require the Court to give effect to the 
foreign anti-suit injunction in Australia.  Rather, what it required was that the parallel 
proceedings and anti-suit injunction be taken into account as a factor in determining whether 
New South Wales was a ‘clearly inappropriate forum’.   In Telesto, her Honour held that 107
whilst the anti-suit injunction was not, of itself, capable of making the New South Wales 
Supreme Court a ‘clearly inappropriate forum’, when combined with the fact that 
substantially identical proceedings between the same parties were already on foot in 
Singapore, her Honour granted the stay.  108
Taking a step back, there were four intrinsically linked (but perhaps contradictory) interests at 
stake: (1) the commercial and judicial interest in litigating the matter in the most appropriate 
forum; (2) the commercial and judicial interest in avoiding the duplication of proceedings; (3) 
the political need to uphold the sovereignty of the State of Singapore by providing due 
recognition for its judicial acts; and (4) the political need to uphold the sovereignty of 
Australia by reinforcing the Court’s right to adjudicate on matters falling within its regulatory 
 The High Court did note that the different between the ‘clearly inappropriate forum’ test and ‘more appropriate forum’ 105
test may result in cases where it is held that the available foreign forum is the natural or more appropriate forum but it cannot 
be said that the Australian forum is clearly inappropriate.  However, the High Court did not consider the implications of this 
result in light of the requirements of comity: CSR Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 345 at 558 per 
Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ.
 Telesto Investments Ltd v UBS AG [2012] NSWSC 44.106
 Ibid at 100-111 per Ward J.107
 Ibid at 115 per Ward J. Similar comments were made and a similar decision was given in Commonwealth Bank of 108
Australia v White (No 3) [2000] VSC 259.
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scope and not simply submitting to a foreign court order (the Singaporean anti-suit 
injunction).  Evidently, comity provided the Court with a legal means of appropriately 
balancing and reconciling these interests in the law.  By recognising the foreign judicial acts 
as a non-decisive factor to be taken into account for the purpose of determining whether the 
Australian court was a clearly inappropriate forum, the Court respected the sovereignty of the 
foreign State by showing due recognition for its judicial acts in Australia (the anti-suit 
injunction and the ongoing proceedings) while also sparing the sovereignty of Australia (or at 
least its image). 
Further interesting observations can also be made as to comity’s ability to develop 
transnational law in the High Court’s ultimate rejection of the ‘more appropriate forum’ test 
originating in Spiliada.  In Voth  it had been argued before the High Court that the ‘more 109
appropriate forum’ test had been accepted not only in England but also in other 
jurisdictions.   In response, the High Court held that if the test in Spiliada enunciated ‘a 110
principle which commanded general acceptance among other countries, it would obviously 
be desirable in the interests of international comity’ that it also be adopted in Australia.   111
Transnational consistency is both a commercially and judicially desirable thing and comity 
requires that Australian courts strive for such an aim where possible. 
Evidently, the dictates of comity were pulling in two different direction: (1) in favour of 
adopting a test that was generally accepted; and (2) in favour of adopting a different test 
because the former was deemed less consistent with the principle of comity.  Ultimately, the 
High Court was not persuaded that there was a real international consensus as to the test that 
should govern stays on grounds of forum non conveniens  and thus it was free to develop its 112
own test – the ‘clearly inappropriate forum’ test.  However, it did appear to suggest that 
comity would require that it put aside its preference for the ‘clearly inappropriate forum’ test 
if an alternate test were to achieve general international acceptance.  Indeed the High Court 
 Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538.109
 Ibid at 560 per Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ.110
 Ibid at 560-561 per Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ.111
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seemed to recognise the commercial and judicial need to create uniform translation law or at 
least harmonise transnational solutions to transnational problems.  Such a position reflects a 
move away from the national to the transnational, from the strict compartmentalisation of 
States and their laws to States as players in a transnational legal game.  Most interestingly, 
the High Court recognised that comity was the language of this change. 
4.1.2.The role of comity in granting anti-suit injunctions 
Comity has also played, and continues to play, a key role in the development and application 
of the law surrounding the granting of anti-suit injunctions.  Despite operating in personam – 
in that they work to restrain parties rather than foreign courts – anti-suit injunctions 
nevertheless interfere, albeit indirectly, with the processes of foreign courts.  This has led 
some States to consider the use of anti-suit injunctions to be an unacceptable challenge to the 
doctrine of sovereignty – regardless of the circumstances of the case.   However, Australian 113
courts recognise that, despite their interference with the sovereignty of foreign States, in 
certain circumstances anti-suit injunctions will not pose an ‘unacceptable’ challenge to the 
doctrine of sovereignty.  For this reason, comity will always be a relevant consideration in the 
determination of whether or not an anti-suit injunction should be granted. 
Due to the interference caused by anti-suit injunctions with the processes of foreign courts, 
comity favours restriction of the power to grant anti-suit injunctions.  However, it does not 
pose a complete bar to the exercise of the power, recognising that in certain circumstances 
there may be a commercial and judicial interest in exercising the power and that it will not 
always constitute an unacceptable challenge to the doctrine of sovereignty.  In CSR Ltd  the 114
High Court held that comity demands courts proceed very carefully when considering the use 
of their judicial power to grant anti-suit injunctions, whether it be founded in the court’s 
inherent or equitable jurisdiction.   The result is that courts are required to balance the 115
likelihood that the exercise of power will be considered an unacceptable challenge to the 
 Most notably, anti-suit injunctions are prohibited under the Brussels Regime: Turner v Grovit [2004] ECR 1–3565 at 113
para 19-31; also see Turner v Grovit [2005] 1 AC 101.
 CSR Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 345.114
 Ibid at 396 per Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ. Similar comments have been made in a 115
number of other cases.  See most notably: National Mutual Holdings Pty Ltd v Sentry Corp (1989) 22 FCR 209 at 232 per 
Gummow J; Sunland Waterfront (BVI) Ltd v Prudentia Investments Pty Ltd [2013] VSCA 237 at 519 per Warren CJ, Osborn 
JA and Macaulay AJA; Sunland Waterfront (BVI) Ltd v Prudentia Investments Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCA 312 at 20-21 per 
Logan J; QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd v Gregory Robert Hotchin and Ors [2011] NSWSC 681.
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doctrine of sovereignty verses the commercial and judicial interests in favour of granting the 
anti-suit injunction.   
Two recent cases - QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd  and Sunland Waterfront (BVI) Ltd  -116 117
help illustrate how courts make this judgement in practice.  In each case, an anti-suit 
injunction was granted with each Court holding that the existence of significant commercial 
and judicial reasons favoured the granting of an anti-suit injunction, while the lack of any real 
connection between the matter and the foreign jurisdiction meant that it was unlikely that the 
foreign State would perceive the anti-suit injunction as a breach of their sovereignty.   In 118
each case the Court conducted a balancing exercise between these two factors – on the one 
hand, the commercial and judicial need to exercise the power, and on the other, the need to 
ensure courts do not unacceptably challenge the doctrine of sovereignty by unduly interfering 
in the processes of foreign court.  119
The case law demonstrates that in determining whether an anti-suit injunction should be 
granted the court will outline the existence of significant commercial and judicial needs to 
exercise the power.  The commercial and judicial needs are required to be significant because 
the infringement caused by the anti-suit injunction to the sovereignty of the foreign State is 
unlikely to be light either.  If such commercial and judicial needs are established, comity 
demands that the court weigh these considerations against the foreign State’s sovereign 
interests.  
From a sovereign interest perspective, comity demands that the court undertake an analysis of 
the connecting factors between the matter and the foreign jurisdiction to determine the level 
of interference the anti-suit injunction will have in the foreign jurisdiction.  The closer the 
connection between the matter and the foreign jurisdiction, the more difficult it will be to 
grant the anti-suit injunction.  In situations where it is commercially and judicially important 
to grant an anti-suit injunction, courts often stress the lack of connection between the matter 
 QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd v Gregory Robert Hotchin and Ors [2011] NSWSC 681.116
 Sunland Waterfront (BVI) Ltd v Prudentia Investments Pty Ltd (No 1) [2012] VSC 1 (upheld in Sunland Waterfront (BVI) 117
Ltd v Prudentia Investments Pty Ltd [2013] VSCA 237.
 QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd v Gregory Robert Hotchin and Ors [2011] NSWSC 681 at 23 per Bergin CJ; Sunland 118
Waterfront (BVI) Ltd v Prudentia Investments Pty Ltd (No 1) [2012] VSC 1 at 52-54 per Croft J (upheld in Sunland 
Waterfront (BVI) Ltd v Prudentia Investments Pty Ltd [2013] VSCA 237 per Warren CJ, Osborn JA and Macaulay AJA).
 Ibid.119
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and the foreign jurisdiction in comparison to its connection with Australia.  For example, in 
Ace Insurance Ltd v Moose Enterprise Pty Ltd,  Brereton J granted an anti-suit injunction 120
holding that: 
… given the choice of law, the jurisdiction clause (even if it be non-exclusive), the 
location of the parties, where they made their contract, and the very faint connection 
with California, the invocation of Californian jurisdiction… is unconscionable, 
vexatious and oppressive in the relevant sense. In other words, California is a clearly 
inappropriate forum for the resolution of this dispute.  121
Where there are clear commercial and judicial reasons to exercise the power, courts will often 
go to great lengths to stress the lack of connection the matter has with the foreign State and 
the comparative existence of significant commercial and judicial reasons to exercise the 
judicial power.  Likewise, courts will often go to great lengths to stress the utmost respect and 
recognition for the foreign jurisdiction.  For example, in Sunland Waterfront (BVI) Ltd,  122
Croft J, in granting an anti-suit injunction, made a point to demonstrate that the injunction 
was not intended as any comment or reflection on the competency, adequacy or willingness 
of the courts of the foreign jurisdiction or the adequacy of its laws.  He reinforced his point 
by recognising that to suggest as such would be entirely inappropriate and against 
considerations of comity.   Similarly, in QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd  Bergin CJ, in 123 124
granting an anti-suit injunction, provided the defendants with the liberty to apply to the Court 
should there be any developments in the foreign jurisdiction that would make it inappropriate 
to continue the anti-suit injunction.  125
4.2. Adjudicating on foreign law and acts 
 Ace Insurance Ltd v Moose Enterprise Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 724.120
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Comity finds one of its strictest expressions in the context of adjudicating on foreign law and 
acts.  If judicial determinations of foreign States were open to question or declared invalid, 
this would likely cause great offence to and resentment among foreign States.  It would do so 
because the doctrine of sovereignty is so deeply seated in the political-legal psyche of States.  
For this reason comity has formed the basis of the ‘rule of non-adjudication’ which restricts 
courts from adjudicating on such matters.  126
In Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty Ltd (No 2)  the High Court held that to permit the 127
validity of the acts of one State to be re-examined and perhaps condemned by the courts of 
another State would, certainly, ‘imperil the amicable relations between governments and vex 
the peace of nations.’   To reflect these sensitivities, comity has formed the basis for the 128
‘rule of non-adjudication’ – restricting courts from adjudicating on the laws and acts of 
foreign States.  The decision in Heinemann Publishers and subsequent High Court cases 
demonstrate that, given the severity of the infringement likely to be caused to the sovereignty 
of foreign States, adjudication of foreign laws and acts is not to occur even in circumstances 
where there may be a commercial or judicial need to do so.  129
The only real exception, as Professor Adrian Briggs points out, is when foreign laws are so 
disgraceful that they cannot truly be considered law at all – for example, Nazi law treating 
Jews as non-people and depriving them of their property and status, or Iraqi law treating 
Kuwait as a non-State and depriving its citizens of their property.   Fair enough – when 130
sovereignty is misused to such a degree, why spare it?  States cannot blow hot and cold – 
they cannot misuse sovereignty to such an extent then claim the right of non-interference 
which the doctrine of sovereignty affords.  
 Attorney-General (UK) v Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty Ltd (1988) 165 CLR 30 at 40-41 per Mason CJ, Wilson, 126
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FCR 278 at 59-60 per Gordon J; Zentai v Honourable Brendan O'Connor (No 3) (2010) 187 FCR 495; McCrea v Minister 
for Customs and Justice (2004) 212 ALR 297. 
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But it would be incorrect to assume that the restriction against adjudicating on foreign laws 
and acts means that comity is unable to accommodate commercial or judicial needs.  Rather, 
it does so on a daily basis.  Take for example, how the same comity-induced principle of non-
adjudication works in the specific context of the recognition of foreign legal entities.  In 
Chaff and Hay Acquisition Committee  Latham CJ held that it was a well established 131
principle that foreign corporations that are recognised as legal entities in one jurisdiction will, 
by virtue of comity, be recognised as legal entities in other jurisdictions.   As a matter of 132
comity the existence of a legal entity under foreign law entitles it to recognition as such in 
Australia without the judgement of Australian courts.   Here sovereign, commercial and 133
judicial aims all point in the same direction – recognising the creation of foreign legal entities 
in Australia is commercially and judicially desirable and at the same time respects both 
domestic and foreign sovereignty. 
4.3. The preclusionary doctrines of res judicata, issue estoppel and Anshun estoppel 
With only limited exceptions, Australian courts will not challenge the authority of foreign 
judgements even where the reasoning of such judgements would be open to criticism.   The 134
position is reflected in the law through the preclusionary doctrines of res judicata, issue 
estoppel and Anshun estoppel.   
In addition to applying to domestic judgements, these three preclusionary doctrines, in 
principle, also apply to foreign judgements.  For res judicata, the law is settled - res judicata 
may arise from a foreign judgement.   For issue estoppel and Anshun estoppel, the situation 135
is slightly less clear, insofar as the High Court has left the question open.   However, recent 136
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decisions from State and Federal Courts demonstrate that issue estoppel  and Anshun 137
estoppel  may also arise from a foreign judgement. 138
The purpose of these preclusionary doctrines is to promote the finality of litigation.   The 139
rationale is that commercial and judicial reality dictates that it is inefficient and inequitable to 
allow the same matter to be heard multiple times – multiple times within the same 
jurisdiction or multiple times in multiple jurisdictions.  These commercial and judicial 
interests are of obvious concern.  However, they must be weighed against the sovereign 
concerns of the foreign State and Australia. 
For foreign States, respect for the doctrine of sovereignty requires that due recognition be 
given to foreign judgements – Australian courts should not challenge the authority of foreign 
judgements even if the reasoning of the foreign court is open to criticism.  Indeed, none of the 
preclusionary doctrines permit such a challenge.   Rather, each doctrine assumes the foreign 140
judgement to be evidence of a decision on the legal position of the parties, or a decision on a 
question of law or fact between the parties.   This is so even if the reasoning of the foreign 141
court is not entirely convincing.  The only requirement is that the foreign judgement be final, 
conclusive and on the merits.   Where these conditions are met, each preclusionary doctrine 142
requires that the court give due recognition to the foreign judgement.  In this context, the 
commercial and judicial need for finality will generally align with the foreign sovereign need 
to respect the judgments of the foreign court. 
However, domestic sovereign concerns must also be taken into consideration.  Under the 
doctrine of sovereignty, States have the right to self-determination and are not bound by the 
decisions of foreign courts.  Concerns for domestic sovereignty would thus appear to pull the 
other way – against recognition of the foreign judgement and permitting Australian courts to 
 Armacel Pty Ltd v Smurfit Stone Container Corporation (2008) 248 ALR 573; Telesto Investments Ltd v UBS AG [2013] 137
NSWSC 503 at 210 per Sackar J.
 Telesto Investments Ltd v UBS AG [2013] NSWSC 503 at 239-240 and 247 per Sackar J; PCH Offshore Pty Ltd (ACN 138
086 216 444) v Dunn (No 2) [2010] FCA 897 at 100-113 per Siopis J adopting the reasoning of Dillon LJ in the English 
Court of Appeal case of Charm Maritime Inc v Kyriakou [1987] 1 Lloyd's Rep 433 at 450.
 Dow Jones v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575 at 36 per Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ.139
 Armacel Pty Ltd v Smurfit Stone Container Corporation (2008) 248 ALR 573.140
 Telesto Investments Ltd v UBS AG [2013] NSWSC 503 at 81 per Sackar J.141
 Linprint Pty Ltd v Hexham Textiles Pty Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 508 at 518 per Kirby P, Samuels and Clarke JJA; Telesto 142
Investments Ltd v UBS AG [2013] NSWSC 503 at 185-186 per Sackar J; Schnabel v Lui [2002] NSWSC 15 at 75-77 per 
Bergin J.
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reopen already adjudicated matters.  However, by forming the basis for the preclusionary 
doctrines, comity has enabled courts to reconcile these domestic sovereign concerns with 
foreign sovereign needs and the commercial and judicial need for finality of litigation.  
Where a foreign decision is required to be recognised by application of one of the 
preclusionary doctrines this does not amount to an unacceptable challenge of domestic 
sovereignty.  Under the doctrine of sovereignty each State has the ability to determine how it 
will deal with matters that fall within its sovereign regulatory scope, including the ability to 
develop and apply preclusionary doctrines that direct courts as to how to deal with foreign 
judgements.  In this sense, Australian courts are not bound by the decisions of foreign courts.  
Rather, they are, by developing and applying these preclusionary doctrines, choosing to 
recognise the effect of foreign judgements in Australia as long as they meet the minimum 
requirements necessary to respect domestic sovereign concerns.  In this sense, comity has 
shaped the preclusionary doctrines in a manner that is respectful of both domestic and foreign 
sovereignty and permits the courts to further the commercial and judicial aim of finality in 
litigation. 
5. Recognition of foreign judgements 
Foreign judgements can typically be refused recognition if they are not consistent with public 
policy.  This is the case in Australia, as it is in most jurisdictions.  Here, the main effect of 
comity is to shape the public policy exception and determine under what conditions foreign 
judgements may be refused recognition.   
As is the case with the preclusionary doctrines, it is both commercially and judicially 
desirable that once matters have been adjudicated they should not be subject to re-litigation.  
Thus, there is a general commercial and judicial interest in recognising foreign decisions.  
Likewise, the due recognition of foreign decisions also respects the sovereignty of foreign 
States.  However, at the same time there are also domestic sovereign concerns that need to be 
taken into consideration.  In some cases, certain foreign decisions may be considered 
offensive to domestic sovereignty. 
Comity reflects this position in the law by shaping the public policy exception in a manner 
that makes it difficult for applicants to succeed in cases where they seek an order from the 
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court refusing recognition.  In order for the requirements of the public policy exception to be 
met there needs to be significant reasons why the foreign decision should not be recognised.  
The authorities demonstrate that courts are generally slow to accept public policy as a ground 
for refusal and there are only a few instances in which foreign judgements have not been 
recognised on this basis.  For the public policy exception to be successfully invoked, 
recognition must offend some principle of Australian public policy so sacrosanct that it is 
required to be maintained at all costs – including the cost of possibly offending a foreign 
State’s sovereignty.  143
The weight of the public policy concerns must be significant because the opposing foreign 
sovereign interests are not light either.  As Kirby P, as he was then, held in Bouton,  144
‘interests of comity are not served if the courts of the common law are too eager to criticise 
the standards of the courts and tribunals of another jurisdiction.’   Likewise, in Jenton 145
Overseas Investment,  Whelan J, making reference to the decision in Bouton, insisted on the 146
view that ‘[t]he respect and recognition of other sovereign states' institutions is important’ 
because there are ‘interests of comity to maintain.’  147
6. Conclusion 
This article has sought to shed light on the importance of comity in the development and 
application of Australian private international law rules through an analysis of its use by the 
Australian judiciary.  It has shown that Australian courts use comity quite often and in quite 
significant ways for the critical task of navigating sovereign sensitivities and transnational 
economic realities.  In this context, case law demonstrates that comity is a flexible and 
adaptive legal tool that permits courts to guide and shape the development and application of 
private international law rules in a manner consistent with relevant sovereign, commercial 
and judicial interests. 
 Jenton Overseas Investment Pty Ltd v Townsing (2008) 21 VR 241 at 246-247 per Whelan J; Traxys Europe SA v Balaji 143
Coke Industry Pvt Ltd (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 438.
 Bouton v Labiche (1994) 33 NSWLR 225.144
 Ibid at 234 per Kirby P.145
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This article’s findings present a very different reality for comity than that which is presented 
in conventional literature.  Our findings suggest that comity is a useful and relevant 148
principle of private international law worthy of further academic attention.  Whilst this article 
has focused solely on Australian jurisprudence, it should hopefully stir the interest of scholars 
and practitioners in other legal systems – particularly those that share a common legal 
tradition.  Hopefully further research will determine whether the importance and relevance 
attributed to comity by the Australian judiciary is a particularly Australian phenomenon, or 
whether it plays an equally important role in other jurisdictions.  149
 Perhaps to put it like Mark Twain, comity may be entitled to claim that rumors of its death are largely exaggerated – at 148
least in Australia.  Mark Twain, noted to reporter Frank Marshall White, London 1897: Shelley Fisher Fishkin, Lighting Out 
For the Territory: Reflections on Mark Twain and American Culture (Oxford University Press 1996) 134: ‘James Ross 
Clemens, a cousin of mine, was seriously ill two or three weeks ago in London, but is well now. The report of my illness 
grew out of his illness; the report of my death was an exaggeration.’
 Initial indications demonstrate that comity may play a similar role in the United Kingdom and to some extent in the 149
United States of America.  Likewise, it should not be forgotten that comity is a civil law invention and thus may continue to 
be relevant in civil law jurisdictions – particularly those in Europe.  Paul, supra note 1 at 22; Watson, supra note 1; Collins, 
supra note 1 at 89; Briggs, supra note 1 at 65
  	40
